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Vietnam and the United Nations 
EXTENSION OF REMARKS 
OF 
HON. MIKE MANSFIELD 
OF MONTANA 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Saturday, October 22, 1966 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent to insert in the REc-
ORD an address that I delivered at the 
J ohns Hopkins University. 
There being no objection, the address 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
VIETNAM AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
I have come here from two weeks of poll tlcs 
In Montana. Elections In my State usually 
Involve a great deal of personal exchange 
wl th voters. This year was no exception. 
Although not running myself, I found the 
campaign as Intensive as Montana Is exten-
sive. It carried me Into confrontation with 
many, many Americans over a trail of thou-
sands of miles. I had occasion to speak to 
Montanans on the range, In the high moun-
tains, along the roads, at ranch and reserva-
tion, a nd In viiJa.ge, town, and city. 
Political campaigning Is not, as it might 
appear to be, an exhaustir.g pursuit. On the 
contrary, at least to the politically sensitized, 
It Is a kind of restorative. It reactivates the 
ablllty to differentiate between what Is Im-
portant and what is gross ly over-rated In the 
public affairs o! the nation. That essential 
perspective, may I say. Is frequently distorted 
In the political prisms of Washlngt~. 
A campaign may be designed to inform the 
voter but it also Informs the campaigner. 
I t unfolds the deep disquiets as well as the 
hopes which move In the political substruc-
ture of the nation. Each election campaign, 
In short, Is a rediscovery of the human side 
of American public life. 
I meet with you fresh from an exposure 
to a cross-section ot American sentiment 
as It exists In Montana, where the frost h as 
long been on the pumpkin and the snows or 
winter have already begun to gather. I meet 
with you • till strongly seized with what 
lies closest to the heart of the people or my 
State. 
I have round in 25 years of public life that 
on fundamental matters , there is not much 
difference between a Montanan outlook and 
the national outlook. I assume, therefore, 
that the basic concerns of the people of 
Montana are your basic concerns, just as 
basic hopes are also probably similar. In 
short, I assume that what Is mos t Important 
In Montana. Is also llkely to be most Impor-
tant here. 
In that veln, I wish that I might say that 
the leglslatl ve record of the 89th Congress 
or some specific aspect of It Is of fundamental 
Interes t to Americans at this time. As you 
know, the Senate and House dealt with a 
great range of publlc problems during the 
past two years. These problems, having ac-
cumulated over a long time, had arisen to 
challenge not only the stability of the na-
tion's political and social structure but even 
the adequacy o! the nation's physical en-
v ironment. 
In my judgment, a very subst :mtlal Icgls -
tlve base l:a.s now been laid for meet ing 
these problems. The record of the 89th Con-
gress Is , Indeed, extraordinary In scope. The 
cognomen, "Great Congress" may well be 
apt. In any event, as a participa n t , I should 
like to think so. 
Yet. in all honesty, I cannot clalm that 
the legislative achievements of these two 
years are a response to what Is most basic 
In the concerns and h opes of the people o r 
the nation. I regret to say that these 
achievements, however significant, are ob-
scured In the shadow which VIet Nam has 
cast over every aspect of the !Ue of the na-
tion. 
The preoccupation of Americans remains 
VIet Nam and Its lmpllcatlons. Every day, 
these Implications grow more personal and 
direct !or more youth and their families. 
The war Is clearly the nexus of the national 
anxiety. And peace lies at the heart of the 
nation's bopes; peace-Its honorable restora-
tion at the earliest possible moment. 
I know that you have heard a great deal 
of VIet Nam over many months. It Is a 
subject from which you might welcome a 
measure o! surcease. By the same token, 
I would prefer to consider some other less 
vexing question, perhaps even the outcome 
of the election. Yet I am Impelled to return 
to this critical matter tonight. 
As you may know, problems of foreign 
relations have concerned me for many years 
and, out or that concern, I have frequently 
addressed myself to the Vietnamese ques-
tion. My views on the situation there are 
generally known and I do not Intend to 
repeat them In detall here. Certainly, I 
bave said time and again-In public state-
ments as well as In the private councils of 
the government--that It does not matter 
much, at this late date, how we became In-
volved In VIet Nam. The point Is that we 
are Involved, deeply Involved, and we cannot 
and we will not withdraw In the absence o! 
an honorable settlement of this question. 
Nevertheless, I believe (and I have so stated 
many tlmes) that It would be to the benefit 
of all concerned If there could be an Imme-
diate contraction of the hostilities and, as 
soon as possible thereafter, their complete 
termination. 
I have long been p ersu ade<l that the Inter-
ests of the United States categorize us as a 
Pacific power bu t that those Interests most 
certainly do nOt commend to us the r ole of 
Asian power. As a P<>clftc power rather than 
an Asian power (and the two are sometlmes 
confused) It Is, In m y ju dgment, wholly 
in our national Interest to r emove American 
military Installations and for ces !rom the en-
tire Southeast Asian mainland , a.s soon as 
that can be done-n.s soon as an honorable 
pence is assured. 
May I say that that view accords w1 th the 
President's proclalmed purpose In VIet Narn 
which is a settlement achieved by negotia-
tions. At ~anlla, moreover, the pledge was 
made that there would be a withdrawal of 
American forces !rom VIet Nam within six 
m on t hs after a basi.s for peace Is established. 
He has alluded, also, time and again, to the 
willingness of the United States to remove 
American bases not only !rom VIet Nam but 
from all of the Southeast Asian mainland. 
This policy has not only been enunclatecl 
by the President; it has been reiterated by 
hiS subordinate<!. His Ambassador at the 
Unit ed Nations, !or example , gave the Presi-
dent's policy Lts most comprehensive expres-
sion In the fiexlble proposals for a VIet-
namese peace which he made at the open-
Ing of the current session of the General 
Assembly. 
It has to be !aced, however, that ! or all 
the words of peace , there Is not only an 
absence o! peace but no visible prospect for 
i ts res toration In the near future. Those 
with whom we are locked In this deadly 
struggle are either not persuade<l o! the 
hones ty of om- purpose In se<!klng the nego-
tiation of an honorable peace or they are not 
Interested In an honorable peace or they 
define an honorable peace In concepts so 
different from our own that, at this point, 
there Is no basis !or a reconctlla tlon of posi-
tions. 
May I add quickly that I assume that some 
such considerations are Involved, because 
there are no ""rtalntles as to why proffers 
of negotiations have been rejected out or 
hand. The fact 1.s that In the absence of a 
confrontation between all the pe.rtlc.lpant~-
the direct and Indirect participants-In this 
confiict, we cannot understand p recisely the 
reasons !or the reluctance to open negotia-
tions. Nor can we define the dimensions of 
the gap which must be br idged before peace 
can be re-established. 
At this time, only one point Is clear. De-
spite the President's obvious willingness to 
confer or to negotiate, we have found no such 
willingness on the part of North VIet Nam, 
the Southern National Liberation Front, 
China., or the Soviet Union. We have been 
unable to enter Into an exchange with any 
participants direct or Indirect In the VIet-
namese war-except those already In sub-
stantial sympathy or agreement wltb us. 
And so. the echo of the words of peace Is 
the continued d in of war. The confl ict In 
VIet Nam has not only failed to contract; It 
has steadily expanded. The proce-ss has been 
relentless. All the while, the options have 
shrunk; the alternatives have grown !ewer. 
It Is not yet clear what It will take to pro-
duce a flicker In the lamp of peace, much less 
what wllJ be required to end the war . Until 
the conmct Is ended, however, It cannot be 
dismissed from our awareness. It cannot be 
b rushed aside In !a vor of more pleasant 
or tractable subjects. It cannot be relegated 
by Indifference to the Inconsequential. 
VIet Nam Is , as I have stated, at the core 
of the concerns and hopes of the people of 
the nation. It Involves, In a very pertinent 
sense, the well-being of every living Ameri -
can and t h e future of the United States. I t 
is interlaced with the Interests or this n a -
tion In Asia and the P acific and throughout 
the world. 
The war Is already a hideous human 
tragedy !or a ll concerned . It h as destroyed 
tens of thousands of lives and has o ut to the 
torch of utter devastation a n Incalculab le 
q uantity of useful resources. It has a lread y 
swept away many o! man's most construc-
t! ve works In VIet Nam, n orth and south. It 
has brought this nation nbout 40,000 casual-
ties to date. It has required r ising exp endi-
tures oi public funds, and their diversion 
from productive works. I n !act, the current 
costs o! the VIetnamese war a re variously 
estimated as running between one and two 
billion dollars a month. 
Even more disturbing, the seeds of a 
much larger tragedy a.re obviously Imp! an ted 
In the VIetnamese situ ation. That the con-
filet can be confined to VIet Nam Is far from 
assured. Actually, It a lready extends In t o 
Laos and there Is ever-present the possibility 
o! its eruption Into a war of regional, con-
tinental or world-wide dimensions. 
The contllct In Viet Nam trL\\Y end, of 
course. long before lt matriculates Into wa r 
with China or universal nuclear catastrophe. 
That Is certainly the rational hope. Whether 
or not It Is an attainable hope Is another 
matter. In any event. the VIetnamese con-
filet now, today, already has the capacity to 
shake the precar ious base of civilized human 
survival. That wlll continue to be the case 
until the war begins to yield to rational 
settlement. 
Whatever else It Is, therefore, the war In 
Viet Nam Is a most urgent warning to all na-
tions. It fiashes a danger signal with re-
spect to the adequacy or the present Interna-
tional lnstrumen ts of peace. These Instru-
ments have not only fa!led to prevent a 
breakdown or pence In VIet Nam; they also 
appear Incapable o! restoring peace In any 
prompt and generally acceptable fashion. 
It Is high time, therefore, to no,e with 
emphasis that the structure of Interna-
tional order which has evolved during the 
past twenty years Is, to say the least, dan-
gerously haphazard. As It Is now, each state 
has Its own formul:\ f or safeguarding the 
security o! Its people. Each state tends to 
blend Into that formula, In various com-
binations, a. supply of unilateral mllltary 
power and a participation In a variety of bi-
lateral and reglon'll defense arrangements. 
Each nation adds to this mixture Its own 
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ntrl uti o ,..h 
run p n 
o e or th e lin r r examp e I 
~ r&! n o! t.rndiUon I c1 plomacy and modem 
wrlaUor.s thenon A'mo«t all nations com· 
plrt<l the bl•nd w1th a daah or the United 
N Uona 
concern<!d Yet all 120 have .,qual D.OCesa to 
aallable ume In the Oe.neral A.so~bly All 
llO have an .,qual b e In thr. oon I of th 
pur&e All 120 ba'Ve an .,qual vo e ln dec!· 
alons c.! the II cmbly 
th Security Coun II to the lo r a 
or tat•. the rol or the United Nat ona has 
om~ l~u nd l pronounced Ind~. 
with respect to VIet N m he U pr enc~ 
Ia acarcely dlacernlbl~ It Ia true thnl the 
dlstlngulahed Secret.ar}·Grn~r I. U Thant. 
has t ktn public note o! the conftlc In \.'le 
Nam and Ita dangers to the world. The sec-
retary-General Is man of pence and an 
acepllonal diplomat. He haa made cl r 
that he Is more than v.·!lllng to place hta 
dedlC t!on nd his kUla at the dlspoaal of 
the disputanta In VIet Nam In his d:plo-
mat!c role, he has outlined '1ewa which 
might provide at aorre point a bula for n 
ullltment of the conftlct and he hns, 
otherwlse, sought tactfully to enga e the 
Interest o! var1oua pn.rUes In a settlement. 
With all due reepec!., however. the etnct:"re 
efforts of the secretary-General are hardly 
to be equated v.lth bringing to bear on this 
situation the potentials o! the United Na-
tions. Vltt Nam Ia, c'carly, a breakdown In 
the pence within the meaning o! the Char-
ter. It contains, clearly, the threat ot an 
expanding v.11r. With these characteristics. 
It would nppenr that the conllict should 
long since have triggered the utilization or 
every resource or the United Nations In an 
effort to reEtore pence Yet, I regret to say, 
that apart !rom the p<'r' onal efforts of the 
Secretary-General, the U.N . reaction to VIet 
Nam has bad something o! the character of 
that o! a dlslnterefted, enervated or lm· 
potent on-looker. It Is almost as though 
the conflict In VIet Na.m were taking place 
not on the other side or this planet but 
rather on some other planet entirely 
It may be, or course, that the U.N. Is un-
able to make a contribution to peace In VIet 
Nam. It may also be, however, that the 
!allure to seek n contribution !rom the UN. 
Ia s misalng Unk In the restoration or peace 
In VIetNam. 
Whatever may be Involved, the non-role 
of the United Nations In this situation 
ought not to go unnoticed An embarrassed 
silence Is no longer a sumctent response to 
the nation's needs or to the world's needs. 
Urgent though It Is, there Is more Involved 
ln these needs even than ending the war In 
VIet Nam. There Is also at stake the pre-
vention of a more monstrous con!l.lct. There 
Is also at stake the continued credibility and 
utility of what has heretofore been a funda-
mental Instrument Ln the structure o! world 
order. 
In my judgment, It Is high time to !nee up 
to the con,plcuous absence o! the U.N. !rom 
the VIetnamese dispute. We need to ask 
why, when the need !or n peace-efTort Is 
ma>.lmnl, the output o! the U.N. Is mlnlm .. l. 
And we need, at the same time, to explore 
every possibility !or the engagement or the 
organization In the effort to bring about a 
termination o! the hostilities In VIet Nam. 
The u N was an essential element, among 
others. In the Korean cease-fire. Why, then. 
1 ts Inconsequence In the problem o! VIet 
Nam? In this connection, It Is mnnl!est 
that there have been striking changes In the 
structure ot the U.N. since the Korean con-
filet. Whatever their v1rtues, It may be that 
the!C changes Inhibit the engagement o! the 
orgnnlzJtlon In VIetNam 
c urt All o! he batan In \ et m 
I ts h rdly an ove cmrnt to note that 
h~ atructure of h General A..uembly Is ap-
paJI,nsly cumbe :nr. Nevrrthel • the 
AsM:mbly has made and It can continue to 
kc lmpc:tnnt oontrlbutl ns or long-
ran e nd rerlphe.ral na ure to the strength· 
enl of wor'd peace With all due r peel 
however. there Is doubt that a body conatl· 
tuted as the General As> embly now Is can 
play a slgnlftc.~nt.-an executive-role In 
dealing with Imminent hre ta of w. r or In 
the re-cstabllshmen t or a peace that h.u 
broken down In my judgrucn , the Gen-
eral A.ssrmbly Is not competent !or that pur-
pose. In my judgment, It Is dclu•lve, at this 
tim~. to expect It to discharge rune Ions or a 
kind which might be helpful In VIet Nom . 
It Is conceivable that alterations In the 
structure or the General A embly might 
remedy Its Inadequacies !or peac-e-keeping 
o- pence-restoring purpmrs. Fr:mcls Plimp-
ton a former US. representative to the UN 
was' rlgh t. perhaps, when he "ug ested that 
the organization was In need or "fnmlly plan-
nln~." It might be that the usc or a single 
spokesman for groups or small states would 
be helpful. It might be, too, that the clus-
tering or smaller states Into one vote on some 
power-projected formula would be helpful In 
Insuring fiscal responsibility and a measure 
or realism tn the significant political deci-
sions or that body. I have no doubt that 
there are any number or technical changes 
which, given sumclent time, cnn be absorbed 
to great advantage Into the structure or the 
Q<lneral 1\ssembly. 
But In all !rankness. I must say that Inso-
far as VIet Nam ls concerned there Is n· •t n 
sumclent margin or time. Moreover, It Is 
not at all certain that the klnd o! wholesal' 
reconstitution or the General J\ssembly 
which would give It a pence-keeping !unc-
tion In VIet Nam and slmUar situations Is 
either practical or desirable. As I have al-
ready noted, t.be General Assembly ha.s other 
usetul, long-range and peripheral !unctions 
or peace. Its value for tho~e purposes 
should not be jeopardized by projecting It 
Into situations for which It wa.s not designed 
and tor which It would have to be severely 
reshaped :t It ls to be effective. 
It seems to me practical, therefore, to look 
elsewhere In the UN structure ror a signifi-
cant contribution to the restoration o! peace 
In VIet Nam. The Charter clearly Indicates 
that, veto or not, we should look first to the 
Secu•lty Council. It may be valid to assume 
that the Security Council Is less U!e!UI as an 
lnstrumen t ot peace-keeping when perma-
nent powers are In disagreement. But It Is 
not at all valid to assume that the Security 
Council Is useless In those circumstances. 
That the Security Counc!l may not be able 
to play the central role ln questions of peace 
does not rule out Its playing or any role. 
V/llntever differences may separate them 
with respect to VIet Nam, the permanent 
powers of the Security Council. I believe, 
have all expressed their grave concern w1t'1 
the situation and tb.e urgent need to do 
something about lt. That Is an entirely ade-
quate ba.sls. It seems to me. on which to turn 
to the council and seek !rom It a contribu-
tion to the restoration o! peace In VIet Nam. 
Let me make clear that miracles are not 
to be expected 1111 that can reasonably he 
asked Is a wholehearted effort to do what can 
be done to further peace. The least that 
should be expected, or accepted, It seems to 
me, Is n v.tlllngness on the part or the Coun-
cil to confront the Issue or VIet Nam and to 
confront tt oon. 
hav ntllrmed. I bellen, th• ru damen 
r 1 vance of the G c a Aecorda ID 4 
the Is tor tUem~nt of the oo nl t 
t.alnly, ho Unltt'd Stn has d ne o 
We nerd to knov.· authorltA lnly and lm-
1 rtlally, "ha the r.,qulr•m :nta moy be In 
current clrcuullltnn for the rr erUon .,! 
tbe G~neva AC<:Orda as a !<'gal b a t r A 
r~storatlon or peace w~ ne<-d to know too 
what rntUt be done eoonrr or lnt~r b all the 
p rtl directly or lndlr lly lnvoht'd In t' 
VIetnam e conflict to romp!\ "lth th 
Ger.~\11 llcccrda and o ~·t bl 11 condl Ions 
ror just nd acceptAble peu~ In the c r -
cumstancr.s. Ulerdore, It ml~:ht he u etul 
!or the f\ecurlty Connell to ask an dvl• ry 
opinion o! the Intern tlonal Court on thr.·~ 
que lions 
It would t't'm to me, too. thnt the !'.r.cur-
lty Council Ia an nppropriRt~ setting f r 
cluds-on-the·t!\ble consld~ratton or the pres-
ent po lllotlll o! all the pnr\lclp n <llrcc 
or Indirect and those dct'ply Inter tt'd In 
the conflict In Viet Nam Cert3in of thr 
states ruth a.s the United State , the Sovlrt 
Uuh ... n nnd France are preaE'nt .1s prrn1. n«"nl 
members or the Council Thr. problrm ot 
pnrttclpntlon of the others Is not It ur-
mmmtable In the IIRht of the cxt crtenre In 
the Korenn en e. In that In tnnce, It v:t I 
be recalled, an Invitation was I oued to 
Peking a non-member o! the U N to come 
to the Security Councll and Peking did 1 re-
sent Its case and participate briefly In It 
dl cusslons. 
It a consideration ot the qucotlon or VIH 
Nam before the Security Council Is to h wr. 
m .• ,.lmum utility, there n~s to be present 
not only the Soviet Union, France, the Unl~d 
States a.nd other Se<-w·lty Coun~ll members 
but also Chinn and North VIet Nam and the 
NaUonal Llbemtlon Front. "" well "" S.algon 
In a confrontation ot this kind, we may be· 
gin, at lnst, to understand whether It Is dls-
trtl.l>"t, disinclination, disdain, density, or 
"t':h.'ltever which has so far stoOd In the way or 
negotlntloM !or an honorable settlement. 
We may begin, at last, to measurr rather 
than gue.s.s the gap which must be brtdged In 
the restoration of pe~e In VIet Nam 
To be sure. the proopects or n rrfuMI ot 
the Invitation are obvious. To be sure, the 
proopect..s or a high declble or propaganda 
and Invective, I! the lm·ltatlons are a.c-
cepted, are equally obvious. But these are 
risks which can readily be su~alned when 
the stakes !or all concerned are ns high ns 
they are In VIetNam. Insofar as the United 
Stnt(>S 1.s concerned, It Is In the lntnt'tit ot 
this nation to welcome the conJrontatlon 
The open bar of world oplmon Is one !><'fore 
which we must never healtat.e or rear to place 
this nation ·s policies 
The courst'S which I h:l\'e Indicated are Il-
lustrative of the po681bllltles ot using the Ull· 
tapped ret!Ourcee of the United N.<tlon• t..o 
advance towards pellCe In Vlrt Nnm Thry 
may or may not be relevant :ll this time A 
vigorous effort on the part of the U N may 
prove a.a futile aa all other rfforta to d:tt.e, 
m.llltary and non-military, to tRrmlnate the 
conftlct But with the world enmeoht<l In 
the most dangerous International altuatlon 
since Korea, we must •eek by every av•nu .. 
to facilitate the rutora ton of a. juat puc~ 
111 VIet Nam We owe that to the unfortu-
nltte people ot thal nation, to our • hes And 
to the world 
The most sweeping change, o! course, Is 
that the UN. has become a General A"'em-
bly-orlented organization at the same time. 
that the membership has gro.,,n to over 120 
states. It "'ill be recalled that origmally 
there were 51 united nations. Among the 
pre!~nt members, there are. as t'tere h:n·e 
been slnce the outset. states-Infinitesimal 
and states-Immense and, In brtwecn all o! 
th~ gradation• 
T"1ere are enormous dlfl'erences o! slgnlfl· 
cance among these states lnsotnr as the prac· 
tical problems or maln talnlng peace are 
One cannot foresee, o! cour!e. what can hP 
mw. helpfully done by tbe UN. What ought 
to be clear at thla point. however. Is th ~ 
doln nothing In the U. N hna not helped 
tn V1et Nnm There are discernible lines or 
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